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DEBATING "BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS" SYMPOSIUM
Beyond Human Rights: 
Beyond a Convertible 
Vattelian?
Anne Peters’ Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the 
Individual in International Law is an impressive scholarly 
intervention, which can be read both as a standalone 
contribution to the debates about the position of the 
individual in international law, as well as a companion to 
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Peters’ previous work on global constitutionalism and the 
constitutionalization of international law.
Three registers of international legal theory
In a way similar to a number of recent monographs that 
contribute simultaneously to international legal doctrine and 
international legal theory, Peters’ argument operates in 
three registers. The first is descriptive, as Peters seeks to 
“describe and systematize” the expansion of individual rights 
and duties in international law “in a legally meaningful way”. 
The second register is polemical, as Peters also seeks to 
evaluate this development, and put in its place recent 
“assertions of a novel Statism” fed by recent “political 
disappointments” with Western ““abuses”” of international 
law. Here, Peters offers a “scholarly analysis” that seeks to 
provoke a “tension” in the claims of statist neo-Vattelians, 
defend the “global legal acquis individuel”, and, finally, 
defend the claim that “the time has come for the 
international individual right”. The first two set the scene for 
the third—ethico-political—register of Peters’ argument. The 
rhetorical purpose of the excavation of past theoretical 
arguments in favour of international legal status of the 
individual, together with the survey of the occasional 
recognition of such status in legal practice (in Chapter 2), is 
not simply to demonstrate the thoroughness of Peters’ 
engagement with the problematique, but to also contribute 
to the credibility of her ongoing ethico-political project: a 
“ius cosmopoliticum” based on “normative individualism” 
and the international rule of law grounded in liberal 
principles of legality.
Rather than engaging the specifics of Peters’ argument in the 
first or the second register, the aim of this brief comment is 
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to interrogate the intended (or unintended) reach of the 
style of the argument which blends the (re)construction of 
disciplinary developments with normative argumentation 
and political vision. In other words, while Peters purports to 
offer a “scholarly analysis”, it is nonetheless fair to ask who 
stands a chance of being persuaded by it. While she pits her 
arguments against contemporary dignifiers of statism in 
international law, one could argue that only a relatively 
narrow subset among them could be converted to a position 
of ius cosmopoliticum.
Ius cosmopoliticum: only for the bourgeois?
Peters is largely aware of these challenges. She prefaces the 
English edition of Beyond Human Rights with a recognition 
of the fact that “non-Western States and cultures … have 
their own views on the meaning of human rights”. In Chapter 
17, she indirectly returns to those perspectives by conceding 
in part to the “communitarian” critique, immediately 
qualifying it by claiming that “the exaggeration of individual 
rights seems much less an issue on the level of international 
law where rights (of humans) are anyway still the exception 
and sparse”.
The “anyway” in her response points to a problem, however. 
Peters’ project in its totality is implicated in the affirmation 
of a certain political trajectory where the rights of humans in 
international law are not exceptional and sparse, but 
ubiquitous. While Peters’ book is not devoted to the 
institutional blueprint of ius cosmopoliticum, its fragments 
are nonetheless discernible in her argument. For example, in 
discussing the possibilities for the political participation of 
individuals in the international arena she observes that “[t]
he individual is not yet able to play the part of an 
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international citizen [and that] a universal constitutional 
democracy, in which [she] is not only vested with 
international rights and duties but also is (directly) 
represented … is still far away” [emphases mine]. At the end 
of the book, the overarching ethico-political frame of the 
project becomes fully visible. “Universal constitutional 
democracy” is not a placeholder for Vattelianism tamed by 
international individual right, but rather a vision of the world 
where “politics and law ultimately should be guided and 
justified by the concerns of the people affected by them”.
The question of who can be expected to be persuaded by the 
polemical and ethico-political registers of Peters’ argument 
arises not only in the context of the general ethico-political 
frame of her analysis, but also in the context of her ancillary 
commitments that accompany “universal constitutional 
democracy”. In the former, it is difficult to expect that 
radical critics of international law, or of the idea of 
constitutionalism, or of Kantian political geography, might 
embrace the project of “ius cosmopoliticum”. More 
interesting, however, is a narrower question: What kind of a 
Vattelian statist may be persuaded by Peters’ argument? 
From that point of view, it seems that the second and the 
third register of Peters’ argument partake in a family quarrel 
between liberal-democratic nationalists and liberal-
democratic cosmopolitans, both of which approach the 
socioeconomic sphere from a “market economic 
perspective”. From this perspective—explicitly embraced by 
Peters—”[t]he economic power of private capital is not 
structurally comparable to the political apparatus of the 
State responsible for public welfare”.  In my mind, that claim 
is dubious and can be unpacked on its own. What is more 
important for the purposes of this short comment is that it 
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implicates universal constitutional democracy-to-come in a 
muted apology of global capitalism, where “international 
regulation of the enterprise should not amount to an 
inhibiting restriction of entrepreneurial freedoms that are in 
turn protected by fundamental rights (economic 
freedom and property rights).” 
It seems then that the second and the third register of 
Peters’ argument will most powerfully influence a particular 
kind of Vattelian statist—a “global bourgeois”, as Peters’ 
herself calls him—whose political sentiments are malleable 
enough to shift from nationalism to cosmopolitanism, but 
who is otherwise staunchly capitalist. For those who are not 
willing to discard the emancipatory promise of universal 
constitutional democracy out of hand, however, Peters’ 
implicit embrace of global capitalism opens interesting 
questions. Is it possible to imagine a non-capitalist non-
liberal democratic ius cosmopoliticum without reliance on 
entrepreneurial freedoms and property rights? Or are we, in 
buying “global individual acquis” also buying into the 
perpetuation of (perhaps tamed and constrained) global 
hegemony of neo-liberalism? 
What kind of democracy in ‘universal constitutional 
democracy’?
Peters’ answer, I suspect, would be not necessarily. As she 
stresses, rights have both a practical utility as well as an 
emancipatory, “reality-shaping character”. Optimistically, 
one can imagine that global capitalism may be tamed 
through “transnational multistakeholder initiatives and 
public-private partnerships” and the participation of non-
state actors in “transnationalized negotiation processes”. 
Even more optimistically, one could imagine that a “dual 
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democracy”—where one track is reserved for individual 
political participation at the international level—might 
contribute not only to further erosion of global capitalism, 
but also to the erosion of the political structures that sustain 
it. 
One of the principled problems with this—not necessarily 
Peters’—vision of the emancipatory potential of 
internationalized, (Kantian) democracy is that it is reactive, 
destined to perpetually lag behind, what Karl Rove called “a 
reality-based community” and its factual imposition of ever 
new patterns of affectedness. Peters seems to be aware of 
that risk. In her discussion of novel ways of transnational 
political participation, she recognizes that those who 
participate in innovative consultation processes on the 
grounds of affectedness are “not empowered to initiate a 
project themselves”. However, she sidesteps the 
fundamental ethico-political importance of that question, 
arguing that “[i]t is a question of legal theory whether the 
social actors should be deemed to have original power to 
create law”. The problem with this answer is that it suggests 
that actors’ pouvoir constituant should be treated as a 
theoretical puzzle that can somehow be “resolved”, and not 
for what it is: part of an ethical, political—and why not, 
poetic—commitment to a broader vision of our political 
world. 
Put differently, outside of the audience of capitalist, cosmo-
nationalist convertible Vattelians, the persuasiveness of ius 
cosmopoliticum will depend less on adducing evidence of its 
traces in intellectual history and past legal practice than on 
offering a vision of the role of both reformist and insurgent 
collective action, and its relationship with global 
socioeconomic and ethno-cultural diversity. In the book, 
BACK TO TOP 
Page 6 of 9Beyond Human Rights: Beyond a Convertible Vattelian? | Völkerrechtsblog
05.10.2017https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/beyond-human-rights-beyond-a-convertible-vattelian/
Peters dismissed politically inflected critiques of rights, such 
as Tushnets, as impervious to “any legal argument”. If I am 
right, however, engagement with international legal theory 
should likewise be attuned to their ethico-political minor 
key, irrespective, or in addition to, their doctrinal 
contribution. Given that Peters makes clear that her 
argument bracketed the treatment of topics such as self-
determination—which would perforce have to address the 
question of “original power” to create law—my remarks 
cannot be taken as an objection against the scope and the 
architecture of this book. Nonetheless, in light of Peters’ 
previous work on self-determination—which, she argued, 
only “technically” belongs to collectivities—and her 
awareness of the problem of “original power” exemplified in 
this book, I admit that it would be exciting to see those 
threads brought together in her future work. 
International legal theory: beyond three registers?
Beyond these specific reflections, the aim of my brief 
comment was wider, oriented towards rethinking the styles 
of engagement in international legal theory in general. In 
more explicitly speculating on who stands to be 
persuaded—convertible “bourgeois” Vattelians, global 
constitutionalists, Marxists, TWAIL-ers, constitutional 
pluralists, legal nihilists, or someone else 
altogether—international legal theorists would not only 
more systematically engage the question of their (un)
intended audiences and the ethical and political purposes of 
international legal theorizing, but might also reconsider the 
distribution of their intellectual efforts: from fortifying 
defenses of their own projects towards building precarious 
pontoon bridges among them. 
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